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Abstract. We introduce strategy logic, a logic that treats strategies in
two-player games as explicit first-order objects. The explicit treatment
of strategies allows us to specify properties of nonzero-sum games in a
simple and natural way. We show that the one-alternation fragment of
strategy logic is strong enough to express the existence of Nash equilibria
and secure equilibria, and subsumes other logics that were introduced to
reason about games, such as ATL, ATL∗, and game logic. We show that
strategy logic is decidable, by constructing tree automata that recognize
sets of strategies. While for the general logic, our decision procedure is
nonelementary, for the simple fragment that is used above we show that
the complexity is polynomial in the size of the game graph and opti-
mal in the size of the formula (ranging from polynomial to 2EXPTIME
depending on the form of the formula).
1 Introduction
In graph games, two players move a token across the edges of a graph in order
to form an infinite path. The vertices are partitioned into player-1 and player-2
nodes, depending on which player chooses the successor node. The objective of
player 1 is to ensure that the resulting infinite path lies inside a given winning set
Ψ1 of paths. If the game is zero-sum, then the goal of player 2 is to prevent this.
More generally, in a nonzero-sum game, player 2 has her own winning set Ψ2.
Zero-sum graph games have been widely used in the synthesis (or control)
of reactive systems [22, 24], as well as for defining and checking the realizability
of specifications [1, 8], the compatibility of interfaces [7], simulation relations
between transition systems [11, 19], and for generating test cases [3], to name
just a few of their applications. The study of nonzero-sum graph games has been
more recent, with assume-guarantee synthesis [4] as one of its applications.
The traditional formulation of graph games consists of a two-player graph
(the “arena”) and winning conditions Ψ1 and Ψ2 for the two players (in the
zero-sum case, Ψ1 = ¬Ψ2), and asks for computing the winning sets W1 and W2
of vertices for the two players (in the zero-sum case, determinacy [18] ensures
that W1 = ¬W2). To permit the unambiguous, concise, flexible, and structured
expression of problems and solutions involving graph games, researchers have
introduced logics that are interpreted over two-player graphs. An example is the
temporal logic ATL [2], which replaces the unconstrained path quantifiers of CTL
with constrained path quantifiers: while the CTL formula ∀Ψ asserts that the
path property Ψ is inevitable —i.e., Ψ holds on all paths from a given state—
the ATL formula 〈〈1〉〉Ψ asserts that Ψ is enforcible by player 1 —i.e., player 1 has
a strategy so that Ψ holds on all paths that can result from playing that strat-
egy. The logic ATL has proved useful for expressing proof obligations in system
verification, as well as for expressing subroutines of verification algorithms.
However, because of limitations inherent in the definition of ATL, several
extensions have been proposed [2], among them the temporal logic ATL∗, the
alternating-time µ-calculus, and a so-called game logic of [2]: these are motivated
by expressing general ω-regular winning conditions, as well as tree properties of
computation trees that result from fixing the strategy of one player (module
checking [17]). All of these logics treat strategies implicitly through modalities.
This is convenient for zero-sum games, but awkward for nonzero-sum games. In-
deed, it was not known if Nash equilibria, one of the most fundamental concepts
in game theory, can be expressed in these logics.
In order to systematically understand the expressiveness of game logics, and
to specify nonzero-sum games, we study in this paper a logic that treats strategies
as explicit first-order objects. For example, using explicit strategy quantifiers,
the ATL formula 〈〈1〉〉Ψ becomes (∃x ∈ Σ)(∀y ∈ Γ )Ψ(x, y) —i.e., “there exists
a player-1 strategy x such that for all player-2 strategies y, the unique infinite
path that results from the two players following the strategies x and y satisfies
the property Ψ .” Strategies are a natural primitive when talking about games
and winning, and besides ATL and its extensions, Nash equilibria are naturally
expressible in strategy logic.
As an example, we define winning secure equilibria [5] in strategy logic. A
winning secure equilibrium is a special kind of Nash equilibrium, which is im-
portant when reasoning about the components of a system, each with its own
specification. At such an equilibrium, both players can collaborate to satisfy the
combined objective Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2. Moreover, whenever player 2 decides to abandon
the collaboration and enforce ¬Ψ1, then player 1 has the ability to retaliate and
enforce ¬Ψ2; that is, player 1 has a winning strategy for the relativized objective
Ψ2 ⇒ Ψ1 (where ⇒ denotes implication). The symmetric condition holds for
player 2; in summary: (∃x ∈ Σ)(∃y ∈ Γ )[(Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2)(x, y) ∧ (∀y′ ∈ Γ )(Ψ2 ⇒
Ψ1)(x, y
′) ∧ (∀x′ ∈ Σ)(Ψ1 ⇒ Ψ2)(x′, y)]. Note that the same player-1 strategy
x which is involved in producing the outcome Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2 must be able to win for
Ψ2 ⇒ Ψ1; such a condition is difficult to state without explicit quantification
over strategies.
Our results are twofold. First, we study the expressive power of strategy logic.
We show that the logic is rich enough to express many interesting properties
of zero-sum and nonzero-sum games that we know, including ATL∗, game logic
(and thus module checking), Nash equilibria, and secure equilibria. Indeed, ATL∗
and the equilibria can be expressed in a simple fragment of strategy logic with
no more than one quantifier alternation (note the ∃∀ alternation in the above
formula for defining winning secure equilibria). We also show that the simple
one-alternation fragment can be translated to ATL∗ (the translation in general
is double exponential in the size of the formula) and thereby the equilibria can
be expressed in ATL∗.
Second, we analyze the computational complexity of strategy logic. We show
that, provided all winning conditions are specified in linear temporal logic (or by
word automata), strategy logic is decidable. The proof goes through automata
theory, using tree automata to specify the computation trees that result from
fixing the strategy of one player. The complexity is nonelementary, with the
number of exponentials depending on the quantifier alternation depth of the
formula. In the case of the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic,
which suffices to express ATL∗ and equilibria, we obtain much better bounds:
for example, for infinitary path formulas (path formulas that are independent of
finite prefixes), there is a linear translation of a simple one-alternation fragment
formula to an ATL∗ formula.
In summary, strategy logic provides a decidable language for talking in a
natural and uniform way about all kinds of properties on game graphs, includ-
ing zero-sum, as well as nonzero-sum objectives. Of course, for more specific
purposes, such as zero-sum reachability games, more restrictive and less expen-
sive logics, such as ATL, are more appropriate; however, the consequences of
such restrictions, and their relationships, is best studied within a clean, general
framework such as the one provided by strategy logic. In other words, strategy
logic can play for reasoning about games the same role that first-order logic with
explicit quantification about time has played for temporal reasoning: the latter
has been used to categorize and compare temporal logics (i.e., logics with implicit
time), leading to a notion of completeness and other results in correspondence
theory [10, 15].
In this work we consider perfect-information games and, consequently, only
pure strategies (no probabilistic choice). An extension of this work to the set-
ting of partial-information games is an interesting research direction (cf. [12]).
Other possible extensions include reasoning about concurrent games and about
perfect-information games with probabilistic transitions, as well as increasing
the expressive power of the logic by allowing more ways to bound strategies
(e.g., comparing strategies).
2 Graph Games
A game graph G = ((S,E), (S1, S2)) consists of a directed graph (S,E) with
a finite set S of states, a set E of edges, and a partition (S1, S2) of the state
space S. The states in S1 are called player-1 states; the states in S2, player-2
states. For a state s ∈ S, we write E(s) to denote the set {t | (s, t) ∈ E} of
successor states. We assume that every state has at least one out-going edge;
i.e., E(s) is nonempty for all s ∈ S.
Plays. A game is played by two players: player 1 and player 2, who form an
infinite path in the game graph by moving a token along edges. They start by
placing the token on an initial state and then they take moves indefinitely in the
following way. If the token is on a state in S1, then player 1 moves the token
along one of the edges going out of the state. If the token is on a state in S2,
then player 2 does likewise. The result is an infinite path π = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 in
the game graph; we refer to such infinite paths as plays. Hence given a game
graph G, a play is an infinite sequence 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉 of states such that for all
k ≥ 0, we have (sk, sk+1) ∈ E. We write Π for the set of all plays.
Strategies. A strategy for a player is a recipe that specifies how to extend plays.
Formally, a strategy σ for player 1 is a function σ: S∗ ·S1 → S that given a finite
sequence of states, which represents the history of the play so far, and which
ends in a player-1 state, chooses the next state. A strategy must choose only
available successors, i.e., for all w ∈ S∗ and all s ∈ S1, we have σ(w · s) ∈ E(s).
The strategies for player 2 are defined symmetrically. We denote by Σ and Γ
the sets of all strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively. Given a starting
state s ∈ S, a strategy σ for player 1, and a strategy τ for player 2, there is a
unique play, denoted as π(s, σ, τ) = 〈s0, s1, s2, . . .〉, which is defined as follows:
s = s0, and for all k ≥ 0, we have (a) if sk ∈ S1, then σ(s0, s1, . . . , sk) = sk+1,
and (b) if sk ∈ S2, then τ(s0, s1, . . . , sk) = sk+1.
3 Strategy Logic
Strategy logic is interpreted over labeled game graphs. Let P be a finite set
of atomic propositions. A labeled game graph G = (G,P, L) consists of a game
graph G together with a labeling function L: S → 2P that maps every state s
to the set L(s) of atomic propositions that are true at s. We assume that there
is a special atomic proposition tt ∈ P such that tt ∈ L(s) for all s ∈ S.
Syntax. The formulas of strategy logic consist of the following kinds of sub-
formulas. Path formulas Ψ are LTL formulas, which are interpreted over infinite
paths of states. Atomic strategy formulas are path formulas Ψ(x, y) with two
arguments —a variable x that denotes a player-1 strategy, and a variable y
that denotes a player-2 strategy. From atomic strategy formulas, we define a
first-order logic of quantified strategy formulas. The formulas of strategy logic
are the closed strategy formulas (i.e., strategy formulas without free strategy
variables); they are interpreted over states. We denote path and strategy for-
mulas by Ψ and Φ, respectively. We use the variables x, x1, x2, . . . to range over
strategies for player 1, and denote the set of such variables by X ; similarly, the
variables y, y1, y2, . . . ∈ Y range over strategies for player 2. Formally, the path
and strategy formulas are defined by the following grammar:
Ψ ::= p | Φ | Ψ ∧ Ψ | ¬Ψ | ©Ψ | Ψ U Ψ, where p ∈ P and Φ is closed;
Φ ::= Ψ(x, y) | Φ ∧ Φ | Φ ∨ Φ | Qx.Φ | Qy.Φ, where Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y.
Observe that the closed strategy formulas can be reused as atomic propositions.
We formally define the free variables of strategy formulas as follows:
Free(Ψ(x, y)) = {x, y};
Free(Φ1 ∧ Φ2) = Free(Φ1) ∪ Free(Φ2);
Free(Φ1 ∨ Φ2) = Free(Φ1) ∪ Free(Φ2);
Free(Qx.Φ′) = Free(Φ′) \ {x}, for Q ∈ {∃, ∀};
Free(Qy.Φ′) = Free(Φ′) \ {y}, for Q ∈ {∃, ∀}.
A strategy formula Φ is closed if Free(Φ) = ∅. We define additional boolean
connectives such as ⇒ , and additional temporal operators such as 2 and 3, as
usual.
Semantics. For a set Z ⊆ X ∪Y of variables, a strategy assignment AZ assigns
to every variable x ∈ Z ∩ X , a player-1 strategy AZ(x) ∈ Σ, and to every
variable y ∈ Z ∩ Y , a player-2 strategy AZ(y) ∈ Γ . Given a strategy assignment
AZ and player-1 strategy σ ∈ Σ, we denote by AZ [x ← σ] the extension of the
assignment AZ to the set Z ∪ {x}, defined as follows: for w ∈ Z ∪ {x}, we have
AZ [x ← σ](w) = AZ(w) if w 6= x, and AZ [x ← σ](x) = σ. The definition of
AZ [y ← τ ] for player-2 strategies τ ∈ Γ is analogous.
The semantics of path formulas Ψ is the usual semantics of LTL. We now
describe the satisfaction of a strategy formula Φ at a state s ∈ S with respect to
a strategy assignment AZ , where Free(Φ) ⊆ Z:
(s,AZ) |= Ψ(x, y) iff π(s,AZ(x), AZ (y)) |= Ψ ;
(s,AZ) |= Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iff (s,AZ) |= Φ1 and (s,AZ) |= Φ2;
(s,AZ) |= Φ1 ∨ Φ2 iff (s,AZ) |= Φ1 or (s,AZ) |= Φ2;
(s,AZ) |= ∃x.Φ′ iff ∃σ ∈ Σ. (s,AZ [x← σ]) |= Φ′;
(s,AZ) |= ∀x.Φ′ iff ∀σ ∈ Σ. (s,AZ [x← σ]) |= Φ′;
(s,AZ) |= ∃y.Φ′ iff ∃τ ∈ Γ. (s,AZ [y ← τ ]) |= Φ′;
(s,AZ) |= ∀y.Φ′ iff ∀τ ∈ Γ. (s,AZ [y ← τ ]) |= Φ′.
The semantics of a closed strategy formula Φ is the set [Φ] = {s ∈ S | (s,A∅) |=
Φ} of states.
Unnested path formulas. Of special interest is the fragment of strategy logic
where path formulas do not allow any nesting of temporal operators. This frag-
ment has a CTL-like flavor, and as we show later, results in a decision procedure
with a lower computational complexity. Formally, the unnested path formulas
are restricted as follows:
Ψ ::= p | Φ | Ψ ∧ Ψ | ¬Ψ | ©Φ | Φ U Φ, where p ∈ P and Φ is closed.
The resulting closed strategy formulas are called the unnested-path-formula frag-
ment of strategy logic.
Examples.We now present some examples of formulas of strategy logic. We first
show how to express formulas of the logics ATL and ATL∗ [2] in strategy logic.
The alternating-time temporal logic ATL∗ consists of path formulas quantified
by the alternating path operators 〈〈1〉〉 and 〈〈2〉〉, the existential path operator
〈〈1, 2〉〉 (or ∃), and the universal path operator 〈〈∅〉〉 (or ∀). The logic ATL is
the subclass of ATL∗ where only unnested path formulas are considered. Some
examples of ATL and ATL∗ formulas and the equivalent strategy formulas are as
follows: for a proposition p ∈ P ,
〈〈1〉〉(3p) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∀τ. π(s, σ, τ) |= 3p} = [∃x. ∀y. (3p)(x, y)];
〈〈2〉〉(23p) = {s ∈ S | ∃τ. ∀σ. π(s, σ, τ) |= 23p} = [∃y. ∀x. (23p)(x, y)];
〈〈1, 2〉〉(2p) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∃τ. π(s, σ, τ) |= 2p} = [∃x. ∃y. (2p)(x, y)];
〈〈∅〉〉(32p) = {s ∈ S | ∀σ. ∀τ. π(s, σ, τ) |= 2p} = [∀x. ∀y. (32p)(x, y)].
Consider the strategy formula Φ = ∃x. (∃y1. (2p)(x, y1) ∧ ∃y2. (2q)(x, y2)).
This formula is different from the two formulas 〈〈1, 2〉〉(2p)∧〈〈1, 2〉〉(2q) (which is
too weak) and 〈〈1, 2〉〉(2(p∧ q)) (which is too strong). It follows from the results
of [2] that the formula Φ cannot be expressed in ATL∗.
One of the features of strategy logic is that we can restrict the kinds of
strategies that interest us. For example, the following strategy formula describes
the states from which player 1 can ensure the goal Φ1 while playing against any
strategy that ensures Φ2 for player 2:
∃x1. ∀y1. ((∀x2.Φ2(x2, y1)) ⇒ Φ1(x1, y1))
The mental exercise of “I know that you know that I know that you know . . . ”
can be played in strategy logic up to any constant level. The analogue of the
above formula, where the level of knowledge is nested up to level k, can be
expressed in strategy logic. For example, the formula above (“knowledge nesting
1”) is different from the following formula with “knowledge nesting 2”:
∃x1. ∀y1. ((∀x2.(∀y2.Φ1(x2, y2)) ⇒ Φ2(x2, y1)) ⇒ Φ1(x1, y1))
We do not know whether the corresponding fixpoint of ‘full knowledge nesting’
can be expressed in strategy logic.
As another example, we consider the notion of dominating and dominated
strategies [21]. Given a path formula Ψ and a state s ∈ S, a strategy x1 for
player 1 dominates another player-1 strategy x2 if for all player-2 strategies y,
whenever π(s, x2, y) |= Ψ , then π(s, x1, y) |= Ψ . The strategy x1 is dominating if
it dominates every player-1 strategy x2. The following strategy formula expresses
that x1 is a dominating strategy:
∀x2. ∀y. (Ψ(x2, y) ⇒ Ψ(x1, y))
Given a path formula Ψ and a state s ∈ S, a strategy x1 for player 1 is dominated
if there is a player-1 strategy x2 such that (a) for all player-2 strategies y1, if
π(s, x1, y1) |= Ψ , then π(s, x2, y1) |= Ψ , and (b) for some player-2 strategy y2, we
have both π(s, x2, y2) |= Ψ and π(s, x1, y2) 6|= Ψ . The following strategy formula
expresses that x1 is a dominated strategy:
∃x2. ((∀y1. Ψ(x1, y1) ⇒ Ψ(x2, y1)) ∧ (∃y2. Ψ(x2, y2) ∧ ¬Ψ(x1, y2)))
The formulas for dominating and dominated strategies express properties about
strategies and are not closed formulas.
4 Simple One-Alternation Fragment of Strategy Logic
In this section we define a subset of strategy logic. Intuitively, the alternation
depth of a formula is the number of changes between ∃ and ∀ quantifiers (a
formal definition is given in Section 6). The subset we consider here is a subset
of the formulas that allow only one alternation of strategy quantifiers. We refer
to this subset as the simple one-alternation fragment. We show later how several
important concepts in nonzero-sum games can be captured in this fragment.
Syntax. We are interested in strategy formulas that depend on three path formu-
las: Ψ1, Ψ2, and Ψ3. The strategy formulas in the simple one-alternation fragment
assert that there exist player-1 and player-2 strategies that ensure Ψ1 and Ψ2,
respectively, and at the same time cooperate to satisfy Ψ3. Formally, the simple
one-alternation strategy formulas are restricted as follows:
Φ ::= Φ ∧ Φ | ¬Φ | ∃x1. ∃y1. ∀x2. ∀y2. (Ψ1(x1, y2) ∧ Ψ2(x2, y1) ∧ Ψ3(x1, y1)),
where x1, x2 ∈ X , and y1, y2 ∈ Y . The resulting closed strategy formulas
are called the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic. Obviously,
the formulas have a single quantifier alternation. We use the abbreviation
(∃ Ψ1, ∃ Ψ2, Ψ3) for simple one-alternation strategy formulas of the form
∃x1.∃y1.∀x2.∀y2. (Ψ1(x1, y2) ∧ Ψ2(x2, y1) ∧ Ψ3(x1, y1)).
Notation. For a path formula Ψ and a state s we define the set Win1(s, Ψ) =
{σ ∈ Σ | ∀τ ∈ Γ. π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψ} to denote the set of player-1 strategies that en-
force Ψ against all player-2 strategies. We refer to the strategies in Win1(s, Ψ) as
the winning player-1 strategies for Ψ from s. Analogously, we define Win2(s, Ψ) =
{τ ∈ Γ | ∀σ ∈ Σ. π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψ} as the set of winning player-2 strategies for
Ψ from s. Using the notation Win1 and Win2, the semantics of simple one-
alternation strategy formulas can be written as follows: if Φ = (∃ Ψ1, ∃ Ψ2, Ψ3),
then [Φ] = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ Win1(s, Ψ1). ∃τ ∈ Win2(s, Ψ2). π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψ3}.
5 Expressive Power of Strategy Logic
In this section we show that ATL∗ and several concepts in nonzero-sum games
can be expressed in the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic. We also
show that game logic, which was introduced in [2] to express the module-checking
problem [17], can be expressed in the one-alternation fragment of strategy logic
(but not in the simple one-alternation fragment).
Expressing ATL∗ and ATL. For every path formula Ψ , we have
〈〈1〉〉(Ψ) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∀τ. π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψ} = [∃x. ∀y. Ψ(x, y)] = [(∃Ψ, ∃tt, tt)];
〈〈1, 2〉〉(Ψ) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. ∃τ. π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψ} = [∃x. ∃y. Ψ(x, y)] = [(∃tt, ∃tt, Ψ)].
The formulas 〈〈2〉〉(Ψ) and 〈〈∅〉〉(Ψ) can be expressed similarly. Hence the logic
ATL
∗ can be defined in the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic,
and ATL can be defined in the simple one-alternation fragment with unnested
path formulas.
Expressing Nash equilibria. In nonzero-sum games the input is a labeled
game graph and two path formulas, which express the objectives of the two
players. We define Nash equilibria [13] and show that their existence can be
expressed in the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic.
Payoff profiles. Given a labeled game graph (G,P, L), two path formulas Ψ1
and Ψ2, strategies σ and τ for the two players, and a state s ∈ S, the payoff for
player ℓ, where ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, is defined as follows:
pℓ(s, σ, τ, Ψℓ) =
{
1 if π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψℓ;
0 otherwise.
The payoff profile (p1, p2) consists of the payoffs p1 = p1(s, σ, τ, Ψ1) and p2 =
p2(s, σ, τ, Ψ2) for player 1 and player 2.
Nash equilibria. A strategy profile (σ, τ) consists of strategies σ ∈ Σ and τ ∈ Γ
for the two players. Given a labeled game graph (G,P, L) and two path formulas
Ψ1 and Ψ2, the strategy profile (σ
∗, τ∗) is a Nash equilibrium at a state s ∈ S if
the following two conditions hold:
(1) ∀σ ∈ Σ. p1(s, σ, τ∗, Ψ1) ≤ p1(s, σ∗, τ∗, Ψ1);
(2) ∀τ ∈ Γ. p2(s, σ∗, τ, Ψ2) ≤ p2(s, σ∗, τ∗, Ψ2).
The state sets of the corresponding payoff profiles are defined as follows: for
i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
NE (i, j) = {s ∈ S | there exists a Nash equilibrium (σ∗, τ∗) at s such that
p1(s, σ
∗, τ∗, Ψ1) = i and p2(s, σ
∗, τ∗, Ψ2) = j}.
Existence of Nash equilibria. We now define the state sets of the payoff profiles
for Nash equilibria by simple one-alternation strategy formulas. The formulas
are as follows:
NE (1, 1) = [(∃tt, ∃tt, Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2)];
NE (0, 0) = [(∃¬Ψ2, ∃¬Ψ1, tt)];
NE (1, 0) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ. (∃τ. π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψ1 ∧ ∀τ ′. π(s, σ, τ ′) |= ¬Ψ2)}
= [(∃¬Ψ2, ∃tt, Ψ1)];
NE (0, 1) = [(∃tt, ∃¬Ψ1, Ψ2)].
Expressing secure equilibria. A notion of conditional competitiveness in
nonzero-sum games was formalized by introducing secure equilibria [5]. We
show that the existence of secure equilibria can be expressed in the simple one-
alternation fragment of strategy logic.
Lexicographic ordering of payoff profiles. We define two lexicographic orderings




(p1, p2) 1 (p′1, p
′
2) iff (p1 ≤ p
′
1) ∨ (p1 = p
′
1 ∧ p2 ≥ p
′
2);
(p1, p2) 2 (p′1, p
′
2) iff (p2 ≤ p
′
2) ∨ (p2 = p
′
2 ∧ p1 ≥ p
′
1).
Secure equilibria. A secure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium with respect to
the lexicographic preference orderings 1 and 2 on payoff profiles for the two
players. Formally, given a labeled game graph (G,P, L) and two path formulas
Ψ1 and Ψ2, a strategy profile (σ
∗, τ∗) is a secure equilibrium at a state s ∈ S if
the following two conditions hold:
(1) ∀σ ∈ Σ. (p1(s, σ, τ∗, Ψ1), p2(s, σ, τ∗, Ψ2)) 1 (p1(s, σ∗, τ∗, Ψ1), p2(s, σ∗, τ∗, Ψ2));
(2) ∀τ ∈ Γ. (p1(s, σ∗, τ, Ψ1), p2(s, σ∗, τ, Ψ2)) 2 (p1(s, σ∗, τ∗, Ψ1), p2(s, σ∗, τ∗, Ψ2)).
The state sets of the corresponding payoff profiles are defined as follows: for
i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we have
SE (i, j) = {s ∈ S | there exists a secure equilibrium (σ∗, τ∗) at s such that
p1(s, σ
∗, τ∗, Ψ1) = i and p2(s, σ
∗, τ∗, Ψ2) = j}.
It follows from the definitions that the sets SE (i, j), for i, j ∈ {0, 1}, can be
expressed in the one-alternation fragment (in the ∃∀ fragment). The state sets
of maximal payoff profiles for secure equilibria are defined as follows: for i, j ∈
{0, 1}, we have
MS (i, j) = {s ∈ SE (i, j) | if s ∈ SE (i′, j′), then (i′, j′) 1 (i, j)∧ (i
′, j′) 2 (i, j)}.
The following alternative characterizations of these sets are established in [5]:
MS (1, 0) = {s ∈ S | Win1(s, Ψ1 ∧ ¬Ψ2) 6= ∅};
MS (0, 1) = {s ∈ S | Win2(s, Ψ2 ∧ ¬Ψ1) 6= ∅};
MS (1, 1) = {s ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ Win1(s, Ψ2 ⇒ Ψ1). ∃τ ∈ Win2(s, Ψ1 ⇒ Ψ2).
π(s, σ, τ) |= Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2};
MS (0, 0) = S \ (MS (1, 0) ∪MS (0, 1) ∪MS (1, 1)).
Existence of secure equilibria. From the alternative characterizations of the state
sets of the maximal payoff profiles for secure equilibria, it follows that these sets
can be defined by simple one-alternation strategy formulas. The formulas are as
follows:
MS (1, 0) = [(∃(Ψ1 ∧ ¬Ψ2), ∃tt, tt)];
MS (0, 1) = [(∃tt, ∃(Ψ2 ∧ ¬Ψ1), tt)];
MS (1, 1) = [(∃(Ψ2 ⇒ Ψ1), ∃(Ψ1 ⇒ Ψ2), Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2)].
The set MS (0, 0) can be obtained by complementing the disjunction of the three
formulas for MS (1, 0), MS (0, 1), and MS (1, 1).
Game logic and module checking. The syntax of game logic [2] is as follows.
State formulas have the form ∃∃{1}. θ or ∃∃{2}. θ, where θ is a tree formula.
Tree formulas are (a) state formulas, (b) boolean combinations of tree formulas,
and (c) either ∃Ψ or ∀Ψ , where Ψ is a path formula. Informally, the formula
∃∃{1}. θ is true at a state if there is a strategy σ for player 1 such that the tree
formula θ is satisfied in the tree that is generated by fixing the strategy σ for
player 1 (see [2] for details). Game logic can be defined in the one-alternation
fragment of strategy logic (but not in the simple one-alternation fragment). The
following example illustrates how to translate a state formula of game logic into
a one-alternation strategy formula:
[∃∃{1}.(∃Ψ1 ∧ ∀Ψ2 ∨ ∀Ψ3)] = [∃x. (∃y1. Ψ1(x, y1) ∧ ∀y2. Ψ2(x, y2) ∨ ∀y3. Ψ3(x, y3)]
Consequently, the module-checking problem [17] can be expressed by one-
alternation strategy formulas.
The following theorem compares the expressive power of strategy logic and
its fragments with ATL∗, game logic, the alternating-time µ-calculus [2, 16], and
monadic second-order logic [23, 26] (see [6] for proofs).
Theorem 1. 1. The expressiveness of the simple one-alternation fragment of
strategy logic coincides with ATL∗, and the one-alternation fragment of strat-
egy logic is more expressive than ATL∗.
2. The one-alternation fragment of strategy logic is more expressive than game
logic, and game logic is more expressive than the simple one-alternation frag-
ment of strategy logic.
3. The alternating-time µ-calculus is not as expressive as the alternation-free
fragment of strategy logic, and strategy logic is not as expressive as the
alternating-time µ-calculus.
4. Monadic second order logic is more expressive than strategy logic.
6 Model Checking Strategy Logic
In this section we solve the model-checking problem for strategy logic. We encode
strategies by using strategy trees. We reason about strategy trees using tree
automata, making our solution similar to Rabin’s usage of tree automata for
solving the satisfiability problem of monadic second-order logic [23]. We give the
necessary definitions and proceed with the algorithm.
Strategy trees and tree automata. Given a finite set Υ of directions, an
Υ -tree is a set T ⊆ Υ ∗ such that if x · υ ∈ T , where υ ∈ Υ and x ∈ Υ ∗, then also
x ∈ T . The elements of T are called nodes, and the empty word ε is the root
of T . For every υ ∈ Υ and x ∈ T , the node x is the parent of x · υ. Each node
x 6= ε of T has a direction in Υ . The direction of the root is the symbol ⊥ (we
assume that ⊥ 6∈ Υ ). The direction of a node x · υ is υ. We denote by dir(x) the
direction of node x. An Υ -tree T is a full infinite tree if T = Υ ∗. A path π of a
tree T is a set π ⊆ T such that ε ∈ π, and for every x ∈ π there exists a unique
υ ∈ Υ such that x · υ ∈ π.
Given two finite sets Υ and Λ, a Λ-labeled Υ -tree is a pair 〈T, ρ〉, where T is
an Υ -tree, and ρ: T → Λ maps each node of T to a letter in Λ. When Υ and Λ
are not important or clear from the context, we call 〈T, ρ〉 a labeled tree. We say
that an ((Υ ∪ {⊥}) × Λ)-labeled Υ -tree 〈T, ρ〉 is Υ -exhaustive if for every node
z ∈ T , we have ρ(z) ∈ {dir(z)} × Λ.
Consider a game graph G = ((S,E), (S1, S2)). For α ∈ {1, 2}, a strategy σ:
S∗ ·Sα → S can be encoded by an S-labeled S-tree 〈S∗, ρ〉 by setting σ(v) = ρ(v)
for every v ∈ S∗ · Sα. Notice that σ may be encoded by many different trees.
Indeed, for a node v = s0 · · · sn such that either sn ∈ S3−α or there exists some
i such that (si, si+1) /∈ E, the label ρ(v) may be set arbitrarily. We may encode
k different strategies by considering an Sk-labeled S-tree. Given a letter λ ∈ Sk,
we denote by λi the projection of λ on its i-th coordinate. In this case, the i-th
strategy is σi(v) = ρ(v)i for every v ∈ S∗ ·Sα. Notice that the different encoded
strategies may belong to different players. We refer to such trees as strategy trees,
and from now on, we may refer to a strategy as a tree 〈S∗, σ〉. In what follows
we encode strategies by strategy trees. We construct tree automata that accept
the strategy assignments that satisfy a given formula of strategy logic.
We use tree automata to reason about strategy trees. As we only use well-
known results about such automata, we do not give a full formal definition, and
refer the reader to [25]. Here, we use alternating parity tree automata (APTs).
The language of an automaton is the set of labeled trees that it accepts. The
size of an automaton is measured by the number of states, and the index, which
is a measure of the complexity of the acceptance (parity) condition. The im-
portant qualities of automata that are needed for this paper are summarized in
Theorem 2 below.
Theorem 2. 1. Given an LTL formula Ψ , we can construct an APT AΨ with
2O(|Ψ |) states and index 3 such that AΨ accepts all labeled trees all of whose
paths satisfy Ψ [27].
2. Given two APTs A1 and A2 with n1 and n2 states and indices k1 and k2, re-
spectively, we can construct APTs for the conjunction and disjunction of A1
and A2 with n1+n2 states and index max(k1, k2). We can also construct an
APT for the complementary language of A1 with n1 states and index k1 [20].
3. Given an APT A with n states and index k over the alphabet Λ×Λ′, we can
construct an APT A′ that accepts a labeled tree over the alphabet Λ if some
extension (or all extensions) of the labeling with labels from Λ′ is accepted by
A. The number of states of A′ is exponential in n · k, and its index is linear
in n · k [20].
4. Given an APT A with n states and index k, we can check whether the lan-
guage of A is empty or universal in time exponential in n · k [9, 20].
Model-checking algorithm. The complexity of the model-checking algorithm
for strategy formulas depends on the number of quantifier alternations of a for-
mula. We now formally define the alternation depth of a closed strategy formula.
The alternation depth of a variable of a closed strategy formula is the number of
quantifier switches (∃∀ or ∀∃) that bind the variable. The alternation depth of a
closed strategy formula is the maximal alternation depth of a variable occurring
in the formula.
Given a strategy formula Φ, we construct by induction on the structure of
the formula a nondeterministic parity tree (NPT) automaton that accepts the
set of strategy assignments that satisfy the formula. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the variables in X∪Y are not reused; that is, in a closed strategy
formula, there is a one-to-one and onto relation between the variables and the
quantifiers.
Theorem 3. Given a labeled game graph G and a closed strategy formula Φ of
alternation depth d, we can compute the set [Φ] of states in time proportional
to d-EXPTIME in the size of G, and (d + 1)-EXPTIME in the size of Φ. If
Φ contains only unnested path formulas, then the complexity in the size of the
formula reduces to d-EXPTIME.
Proof. The case where closed strategy formula Φ is used as a state formula in
a larger formula Φ′, is solved by first computing the set of states satisfying Φ,
adding this information to the labeled game graph G, and then computing the
set of states satisfying Φ′. In addition, if d is the alternation-depth of Φ then Φ is
a boolean combination of closed strategy formulas of alternation depth at most
d. Thus, it suffices to handle a closed strategy formula, and reduce the boolean
reasoning to intersection, union, and complementation of the respective sets.
Consider a strategy formula Φ. Let Z = {x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym} be the set
of variables used in Φ. Consider the alphabet Sn+m and an Sn+m-labeled S-tree
σ. For a variable v ∈ X ∪ Y , we denote by σv the strategy that stands in the
location of variable v and for a set Z ′ ⊆ Z we denote by σZ′ the set of strategies
for the variables in Z ′. We now describe how to construct an APT that accepts
the set of strategy assignments that satisfy Φ. We build the APT by induction
on the structure of the formula. For a subformula Φ′ we consider the following
cases.
Case 1. Φ′ = Ψ(x, y) —by Theorem 2 we can construct an APT A that accepts
trees all of whose paths satisfy Ψ . According to Theorem 2, A has 2O(|Ψ |)
states.
Case 2. Φ′ = Φ1 ∧ Φ2 —given APTs A1 and A2 that accept the set of strategy
assignments that satisfy Φ1 and Φ2, respectively; we construct an APT A for
the conjunction of A1 and A2. According to Theorem 2, |A| = |A1| + |A2|
and the index of A is the maximum of the indices of A1 and A2.
Case 3. Φ′ = ∃x.Φ1 —given an APT A1 that accepts the set of strategy assign-
ments that satisfy Φ1 we do the following. According to Theorem 2, we can
construct an APT A′ that accepts a tree iff there exists a way to extend
the labeling of the tree with a labeling for the strategy for x such that the
extended tree is accepted by A1. The number of states of A′ is exponential in
n · k and its index is linear in n · k. The cases where Φ′ = ∃y.Φ1, Φ
′ = ∀x.Φ1,
and Φ′ = ∀y.Φ1 are handled similarly.
We note that for a closed strategy formula Φ, the resulting automaton reads S∅-
labeled S-trees. Thus, the input alphabet of the automaton has a single input
letter and it only reads the structure of the S-tree.
The above construction starts with an automaton that is exponential in the
size of a given LTL formula and incurs an additional exponent for every quantifier.
In order to pay an exponent ‘only’ for every quantifier alternation, we have to use
nondeterministic and universal automata, and maintain them in this form as long
as possible. Nondeterministic automata are good for existential quantification,
which comes to them for free, and universal automata are good for universal
quantification. By careful analysis of the quantifier alternation hierarchy, we
can choose to create automata of the right kind (nondeterministic or universal),
and maintain them in this form under disjunctions and conjunctions. Then, the
complexity is d+ 1 exponents in the size of the formula and d exponents in the
size of the game.
Consider the case where only unnested path formulas are used. Then, given
a path formula Ψ(x, y), we construct an APT A that accepts trees all of whose
paths satisfy Ψ . As Ψ(x, y) does not use nesting of temporal operators, we can
construct A with a linear number of states in the size of Ψ .1 It follows that the
total complexity is d exponents in the size of the formula and d exponents in the
size of the game. Thus in the case of unnested path formulas one exponent can
be removed. The exact details are omitted due to lack of space.
One-alternation fragment. Since ATL∗ can be expressed in the simple one-
alternation fragment of strategy logic, it follows that model checking simple one-
alternation strategy formulas is 2EXPTIME-hard [2]. Also, since module check-
ing can be expressed in the one-alternation fragment, it follows that model check-
ing one-alternation strategy formulas with unnested path formulas is EXPTIME-
hard [17]. These lower bounds together with Theorem 3 yield the following re-
sults.
Theorem 4. Given a labeled game graph G and a closed one-alternation strategy
formula Φ, the computation of [Φ] is EXPTIME-complete in the size of G, and
2EXPTIME-complete in the size of Φ. If Φ contains only unnested path formulas,
then the complexity in the size of the formula is EXPTIME-complete.
Model checking the simple one-alternation fragment. We now present
a model-checking algorithm for the simple one-alternation fragment of strategy
logic, with better complexity than the general algorithm. We first present a few
notations.
Notation. For a labeled game graph G and a set U ⊆ S of states, we denote by
G ↾ U the restriction of the labeled game graph to the set U , and we use the
notation only when for all states u ∈ U , we have E(u) ∩ U 6= ∅; i.e., all states
in U have a successor in U . A path formula Ψ is infinitary if the set of paths
that satisfy Ψ is independent of all finite prefixes. The classical Bu¨chi, coBu¨chi,
parity, Rabin, Streett, and Mu¨ller conditions are all infinitary conditions. Every
LTL objective on a labeled game graph can be reduced to an infinitary condition,
such as a parity or Mu¨ller condition, on a modified game graph.
1 For a single temporal operator the number of states is constant, and boolean combi-
nations between two automata may lead to an automaton whose size is the product of
the sizes of the two automata. The number of multiplications is at most logarithmic
in the size of the formula, resulting in a linear total number of states.
Lemma 1. Let G be a labeled game graph, and let Φ = (∃ Ψ1, ∃ Ψ2, Ψ3) be a
simple one-alternation strategy formula with path formulas Ψ1, Ψ2, and Ψ3 such
that Ψ1 and Ψ2 are infinitary. Let W1 = 〈〈1〉〉(Ψ1) and W2 = 〈〈2〉〉(Ψ2). Then
[Φ] = 〈〈1, 2〉〉(Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2 ∧ Ψ3) in the restricted graph G ↾ (W1 ∩W2).
Lemma 2. Let G be a labeled game graph, and let Φ = (∃ Ψ1, ∃ Ψ2, Ψ3) be a
simple one-alternation strategy formula with unnested path formulas Ψ1, Ψ2, and
Ψ3. Let W1 = 〈〈1〉〉(Ψ1) and W2 = 〈〈2〉〉(Ψ2). Then [Φ] = 〈〈1, 2〉〉(Ψ1 ∧ Ψ2 ∧ Ψ3) ∩
W1 ∩W2.
Theorem 5. Let G be a labeled game graph with n states, and let Φ =
(∃ Ψ1, ∃ Ψ2, Ψ3) be a simple one-alternation strategy formula.





formulas Φ of constant length the computation of [Φ] is polynomial in the
size of G. The computation of [Φ] is 2EXPTIME-complete in the size of Φ.
2. If Ψ1, Ψ2, and Ψ3 are unnested path formulas, then there is a ATL
∗ formula
Φ′ with unnested path formulas such that |Φ′| = O(|Ψ1| + |Ψ2| + |Ψ3|) and
[Φ] = [Φ′]. Therefore [Φ] can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 5 follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 (see [6] for the proofs). We present
some details only for part (1): given Ψ1, Ψ2, and Ψ3 as parity conditions, from
Lemma 1, it follows that [(∃Ψ1, ∃Ψ2, Ψ3)] can be computed by first solving two
parity games, and then model checking a graph with a conjunction of parity
conditions (i.e., a Streett condition). Since an LTL formula Ψ can be converted
to an equivalent deterministic parity automaton with 22
O(|Ψ|·log |Ψ|)
states and
2O(|Ψ |) parities (by converting Ψ to a nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton, and
then determinizing), applying an algorithm for solving parity games [14] and a
polynomial-time algorithm for model checking Streett conditions, we obtain the
desired upper bound. Observe that the model-checking complexity of the sim-
ple one-alternation fragment of strategy logic with unnested path formulas, as
well as the program complexity of the simple one-alternation fragment (i.e., the
complexity in terms of the game graph, for formulas of bounded size), are expo-
nentially better than the corresponding complexities of the full one-alternation
fragment.
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